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Abstract: 
 
Using monthly data from January 1996 up to May 2010 for a panel of 76 developed and 
emerging economies and adopting an instrumental variable estimation technique by 
correcting for both heterogeneity and endogeneity (correlation between the regressors and the 
idiosyncratic error) using the generalized two-stage least squares (G2SLS, EC2SLS) 
procedure method suggested by Balestra and Varadharajan-Krishnakumar (1987) and Baltagi 
(1995), this paper provides empirical evidence that an alternative channel via which growth 
volatility is reduced is through changes in sovereign country ratings. The paper also provides 
a new insight on the effect of global financial crisis (GFC) that it has contributed towards 
increased macroeconomic volatility by weakening this volatility reducing effect of sovereign 
country rating. Finally acknowledging the simultaneity between rating and volatility where 
output volatility may be a determining factor for sovereign country rating, the paper adopts a 
system approach and uses three stage least square (3SLS) estimator and finds that volatility 
reducing effect of country credit rating is robust. The channel via which sovereign rating 
changes affect growth volatility is through sovereign credit default swap (CDS) spread and its 
volatility. 
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Introduction 
Theories of business-cycle and long-run growth once were treated as unrelated areas in 
macroeconomics. However, over the last decade or so there has risen an agreement that 
business cycle volatility is somehow related to long-run economic growth. For instance, 
Kydland and Prescott (1982) show that fluctuations in output are generated by stochastic 
variations in technology, thus integrating growth and business-cycle theory. But they do not 
explicitly model how business cycle volatility affect growth. Economic growth and volatility 
of output growth may be linked, either positively or negatively. For instance, if investments 
are irreversible, then increased volatility can lead to lower investment (Bernanke, 1983 and 
Pindyck, 1991). On the other hand, if countries faced with a choice between high-variance, 
high-expected-return technology and low-variance, low-expected-return technology, opt to 
choose the former then high output volatility will associated with high growth (Black, 1987). 
Ramey and Ramey (1995) is the first and most influential paper to have empirically tested the 
link between output volatility and economic growth which found that countries which have a 
higher volatility of output also have a lower growth rate of output. This result remains 
unchanged even after controlling for other country-specific variables which are found to be 
robust in the literature like investment to GDP ratio. 
Noting that high economic growth is what governments want to achieve, the fact that output 
volatility may induce lower growth is an important finding for policy makers because one of 
the objectives of macroeconomic policies should also be targeted to reduce growth volatility. 
As a result it has become crucial to understand what determines growth volatility.  
Easterly, Islam and Stiglitz (2000) provides an insight into the empirical determinants of 
volatility. They have shown that the development domestic financial sector plays a crucial 
role in lowering output volatility and that this relationship is non-linear. Prasad et al (2004) 
have shown that increase in financial globalization measured interms of cross border capital 
inflow and capital account liberalisation has, on average reduced output and consumption 
volatility in industrial economies and “less financially integrated” developing economies. 
Since sovereign credit ratings assigned by the credit rating agencies (CRAs) can affect the 
country’s creditworthiness and thereby limit or enhance the access to global capital market, 
this paper proposes to test whether sovereign credit rating is another potential determinant of 
output volatility. In particular the paper tests the hypotheses whether credit rating and 
changes to credit rating have any output volatility reducing effects. In addition to this the 
paper also tests whether the global financial crisis (GFC) has contributed to higher volatility 
by interacting with the rating-volatility relationship.  
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on 
sovereign ratings and in particular on the relevance of sovereign ratings for emerging 
economies. Section 3 presents the most important stylised facts of growth volatility and 
sovereign credit rating. Section 4 provides the empirical model and analyses the results. In 
particular, this section analyses the impact of credit ratings on a variety of volatility models 
where a counterfactual analysis is presented. Finally, section 5 provides concluding remarks 
and sketches the major policy implications that follow from this research.  
1. Literature Review 
 
It has been noted that “the recent financial market turbulence has brought credit rating 
agencies under fire” and academia as well as policy-makers argue for a reform of the 
business model of CRAs (Portes 2008). Rating agencies are faced with a serious conflict of 
interest, to the extent that their remuneration comes from rated issuers (Mathis, McAndrews 
and Rochet, 2008), both in the context of public of private borrowers. This is a crucial issue, 
given CRAs’ considerable and increasing role on international capital markets. In this 
context, there is a large and useful literature studying the impact of ratings on market prices 
and bond spreads. Focusing on market prices, Kaminsky and Schmukler (2001) find that 
downgrades and upgrades have an impact on country risk and stock returns: these rating 
changes are transmitted across countries, with neighbour-country effects being more 
significant.  
 
The study of sovereign risk assessment has focused on comparing ratings to market spreads. 
For the period 1987-1994, Cantor and Packer (1996) find a greater impact on spreads from a 
rating change in the case of Moody’s or if it is related to speculative-grade countries. Reisen 
and Von Maltzan (1999) show that rating has asymmetric effects as in the period 1989-1997, 
Fitch, Moody’s and S&P’s downgrades have a significant impact on spreads, contrary to 
upgrades, which were anticipated by the market. For them, sovereign ratings have the 
potential to moderate euphoria among investors on emerging markets but rating agencies 
failed to exploit that potential in the 1990s. Sy (2001) highlights the strong negative 
relationship between ratings and EMBI+ spreads declines during periods of high risk 
aversion (e.g., 1997-1998). Mora (2006) examines Moody’s and S&P’s ratings and concludes 
that the procyclicality of ratings is not ascertained when considering the post Asian crisis 
years. Analyzing sovereign ratings issued by the three agencies for 1993-2007, Gaillard 
(2009) finds that the procyclicality of ratings was much sharper during periods of high risk 
aversion (1997-1998 in particular) than periods of low risk aversion (2005-2007). He also 
highlights the greater stability of Moody’s ratings. In a different way, Cavallo et al (2008) 
develop a simple Hausman specification test and find that there is some informational content 
in sovereign ratings that is not completely captured by market spreads. Additional tests 
reinforce their conclusion that ratings matter. Lastly, going beyond the traditional “ratings vs. 
spreads” view, Roubini and Manasse (2005) present an original sovereign risk assessment 
methodology by using a binary recursive tree. This enables them to better discuss appropriate 
policy options to prevent crises. 
 
2. Sovereign credit rating, macroeconomic volatility and the stylized 
facts 
 It can be seen from the reviews of the papers in section 3 that the focus of these has been 
analysing the effect of ratings on financial variables and not on the macroeconomic variables. 
Sovereign credit rating can have effects on macroeconomic volatility because higher credit 
rating improves a country’s creditworthiness which lowers the cost of borrowing from the 
international market. This allows countries to borrow in bad times and thereby smooth 
consumption and reduce growth volatility. Sovereign credit rating can also serve as signal for 
the overall macroeconomic discipline of the economy, for instances a country with excessive 
deficit will be assigned a lower rating and vice versa. A high credit rating can signal of a 
disciplined macroeconomy boosting both domestic and foreign investors’ confidence and 
thereby reducing investment volatility.  
The paper uses monthly data on sovereign credit rating provided by Standard and Poor for the 
period of January 1996 to May 2010 in 76 developed and emerging economies. In Figure 1 
the graphs of rating, changes in rating and growth volatility are combined together. The data 
are average values for all the countries in the sample. The first panel in Figure 1 shows the 
dynamics of credit ratings from 1996 to 2010. The red line indicates the time since when the 
global financial crisis (GFC) sets in. It can be seen that average monthly ratings have gone up 
through late 90s and early 00s and have remained more or less constant from the early 
months of 2000 until 2003. There seems to be gradual but fluctuating decline of ratings from 
late 2003 until 2006 when it starts rising again but only upto 2007 when GFC sets in coupled 
with a thorough decline in average ratings.  
 
 
 
The second panel in Figure 1 shows the average changes in rating for the sample period. It 
can be seen that in the period prior to 2004, the frequency of positive changes in rating has 
been high compared with period from 2004 to 2010. In the latter period the frequency of 
negative changes in rating is higher. 
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The third panel of Figure 1 shows the dynamics of growth volatility for the same time period. 
Here there seems to three distinct phases. The early months of 1996 to 2000 is a period of 
high volatility followed a by relatively tranquil period from 2001 to 2004 where growth 
volatility has been rather less. From 2005 onward another high volatility period sets in 
continuing through the GFC with increasing in later period of 2010.  
 
Given the pattern in these data there may be a possible link between rating and volatility. 
Before investigating it using an econometric model, it will be useful to combine the rating 
and its changes with volatility together in separate graphs. This is done in Figure 2 and 3 
respectively. In Figure 2, sovereign credit rating and growth volatility are combined to see if 
there is any link between these two. It can be seen at the later part of the data credit rating is 
gradually falling while growth volatility is going up.  
 
 
 
A similar analysis between volatility and changes in rating also shows a possible link 
between volatility and credit rating which can be seen from Figure 3 where growth volatility 
and changes in ratings graphs are combined. High positive changes in rating and low negative 
changes in rating are associated with higher growth volatility. From 1996:01 to 2000:01 – a 
period of high growth volatility – the frequency of large positive changes in rating is 
GFC
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prominent. Similarly, from 2005:01 to 2010:05 – another period of high growth volatility – 
the frequency of negative although low, changes in rating is more prominent.  
 
 
Based on the analysis of the data provided in these data, it is possible to conclude that 
sovereign credit rating and growth volatility could be related as argued in the beginning of 
this section. The next section will present results based on a formal econometric model to see 
if there is any link between credit rating and growth volatility and if this relationship is 
robust. 
3. Econometric Model and Analysis of Results 
In order to facilitate understanding the link between rating and volatility, this section will 
undertake an empirical analysis of the key variables. The specification that will be estimated 
is as follows: 
 
ititit
iititit
uXDRATINGGFC
GFCDRATINGRATINGVOL


64
3210
)(
(1)                                     


 
 
Where VOLit is volatility of growth of per capita real GDP, RATINGit is sovereign credit 
rating, DRATINGit is changes in sovereign credit rating, GFC (global financial crisis) is an 
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indicator variable taking the value equal to 1 if the month is equal to July, 2007 to May 2010, 
and zero otherwise., Xit is a matrix of control variable which include price of oil (OIL) and 
number of stocks traded (STOCK) and uit is the error term. 
 
Expected signs of the estimated coefficients are as follows. Since credit rating and changes in 
credit rating are expected to reduce growth volatility, the expected signs of β1 and β2 are 
negative. The global financial crisis has created greater uncertainty and financial instability as 
a result the expected sign of β3 is positive. The expected sign of β4 which is the coefficient of 
the interacting term is a priori ambiguous. A positive coefficient will imply GFC has 
strengthened the rating – volatility relationship, and a negative coefficient will imply that it 
has weakened it. With regard to the control variables, it is expected that a higher oil price and 
increase in the number of stocks traded will increase growth volatility and hence the signs of 
their estimated coefficients would be positive.  
 
The results of the estimation of equation (1) using a fixed effect estimator are presented in 
Table 1. At first the equation is estimated without interaction term and controlling for other 
variables, and then the controls are added. The estimated results without and with the control 
variables are in columns (1) and (2) respectively. It can be seen in column (1) that the sign of 
RATING is negative and significant. It can also be seen that coefficient of DRATING is also 
negative and significant at 1 percent. Both of these estimations show that credit rating is 
somehow negatively associated with growth volatility. The estimated coefficient of the 
variable GFC is positive as expected, but it is not significant. The robustness of these results 
depend on the addition of the interaction term and the control variables to the regression 
equation. This is done in column (2). It can be seen that the estimated coefficient of RATING 
is negative and remain same as before and also significant at 1 percent while there is only a 
very marginal increase of the magnitude in the estimated coefficient of DRATING but it is 
still negative and significant at 1 percent. As a result based on the current model, it can be 
concluded that credit rating has lead to reduction in growth volatility in this sample. The 
coefficient of GFC is almost similar to its previous value and it is still positive but 
insignificant. This does not give not sufficient ground to conclude that GFC had added to 
growth volatility. However, interesting result arises in estimation of the coefficient of 
interaction term which turns out to be negative although not significant at the conventional 
level (p-value = 0.101).  
Table 1 
 
Dependent variable: Volatility of per capita GDP growth 
(Fixed Effect Estimator) 
Regressor 
 
(1) (2) 
RATING -0.000012 
(-3.60)*** 
-0.000012 
(-3.14)*** 
DRATING -0.000138 
(-4.36)*** 
-0.000105 
(-2.80)*** 
GFC 0.000015 
(0.70) 
0.000013 
(0.59) 
GFC*DRATING  -0.000116 
(-1.64) 
OIL  2.51e
-06
 
(2.44)** 
STOCK   -1.13e
-16
 
(-0.68) 
CONS 0.000311 
(6.74)*** 
0.000296 
(6.29)*** 
F-Statistics and Summary 
Statistics  
 
  
F-statistic testing coefficients 
on DRATING 
(P-value) 
 
 
 
 
0.71 
(0.398) 
R
2
 (within) 0.0035 0.0042 
F-statistic  (overall) 
(P-value) 
11.59 
(0.000) 
6.95 
(0.000) 
No. of observation/countries 10061/76 9952/76 
 
The test of the joint significance of the DRATING variable turns out to be insignificant. 
Hence no conclusion can be made whether GFC has contributed to growth volatility by 
interacting with credit ratings. Among the control variables it is found oil price is also 
contributor to growth volatility because of the estimated coefficient of the OIL variable 
which positive and significant. The same cannot be concluded for the other control variable, 
because STOCK is insignificant. 
 
The results in Table 1 which are analysed above will have to be taken with some degree of 
caution. The estimated coefficient may be biased because the variable RATING could be 
endogenous and be correlated with the error term. Moreover, because the 76 countries in 
sample are chosen from different regions across the world, there is possibility that the 
variance of the error term exhibits some form of heteroscedasticity. These two problems need 
to be addressed in order to have some meaningful results. Therefore to account for 
endogeneity the equation (1) is estimated using an instrumental variable (IV) estimator using 
the following framework: 
ititit
iititit
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

(2)
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The results of the instrumental variables estimation of equation (2) are presented in Table (2). 
The first column presents the fixed effect-IV results correcting for endogeneity but assuming 
standard property of the error term. The variable RATING instrumented with economic risk, 
political risk and financial risk as measured in the international country risk guide (ICRG). 
The results are not too different from those found in the simple FE estimation in Table 1. 
Both the coefficients RATING and DRATING are negative and significant, implying that the 
volatility reducing effect of credit rating is robust. The coefficient of the GFC but 
insignificant as before and the estimated coefficient of the interaction between GFC and 
DRATING is negative but not significant at the conventional level. However, it can be noted 
that the test of the joint hypothesis the DRATING variable is clearly rejected. Hence it can be 
concluded that GFC does contribute to growth volatility by somehow interacting with the 
DRATING variable. The significance and signs of the estimated coefficients on the control 
variables OIL and STOCK are remains unchanged.  
 
The estimation of the model with controlling for country specific heterogeneity implies that 
that there is no time effect. It is possible that some countries in the sample have fixed country 
effects while others have fixed time effects. This requires the use of the random effect 
estimator. In presence of endogeneity the method of estimation is the generalized two-stage 
least squares (G2SLS) procedure method suggested by Balestra and Varadharajan-
Krishnakumar (1987). When the heteroscedasticity of the error term is corrected for within 
this framework the method of estimation is the error corrected generalized two-stage least 
squares (EC2SLS) suggested by Baltagi (1995). Columns (2) and (3) of Table presents the 
generalised 2SLS estimations. In column (2) the results of G2SLS estimation are presented. 
Note that there results almost very similar to those in column (1). RATING and DRATING 
have negative and significant coefficient as before, and for the first time the estimated 
coefficient on the interaction term (GFC*DRATING) is significant at 10 percent level and 
the joint test on the coefficients on both DRATING is comfortably rejected. As a results it is 
now possible to conclude that GFC affects growth volatility by interacting with rating 
changes.  
 
Table 2 
 
Dependent variable: Volatility of per capita GDP growth 
(Instrumental Variable Estimator) 
Endogenous variable: RATING 
Regressor 
 
(1) 
FE-IV 
(2) 
RE-G2SLS 
(2) 
RE-EC2SLS 
RATING -0.000013 
(-3.13)*** 
-0.000011 
(-3.97)*** 
-0.000012 
(-3.79)*** 
DRATING -0.000106 
(-2.81)*** 
-0.000104 
(-2.76)*** 
-0.000103 
(-2.74)*** 
GFC 0.000014 
(0.64) 
0.000010 
(0.46) 
8.95e-06 
(0.41) 
GFC*DRATING -0.000114 
(-1.61) 
-0.000116 
(1.65)* 
-0.000117 
(-1.65)* 
OIL 2.60e-06 
(2.51)** 
1.03e-06 
(2.57)** 
2.65e-06 
(2.57)** 
STOCK  -1.44e-16 
(-0.84) 
-5.40e-17 
(-0.36) 
-3.18e-17 
(-0.21) 
CONS 0.000329 
(5.74)*** 
0.000299 
(7.59)*** 
0.000314 
(6.97)*** 
χ2-Statistics and 
Summary Statistics  
 
   
χ2-statistic testing 
coefficients on DRATING 
(P-value) 
13.50 
(0.000) 
13.65 
(0.000) 
13.51 
(0.000) 
R
2
 (within) 0.0044 0.0044 0.0044 
Wald – χ2 
(P-value) 
300.00 
(0.000) 
45.68 
(0.000) 
44.41 
(0.000) 
No. of observation/countries 9809/76 9809/76 9809/76 
 
In column (2) the variance of the error term is assumed to be homoscedastic. This assumption 
is relaxed, and column (3) provides the estimation of equation (2) using EC2SLS estimator 
where the variance of the error term is allowed to vary across countries. It can be seen that 
correcting for both endogeneity and heteroscedasticity, the link between rating and volatility 
is still negative – the estimated coefficients on RATING and DRATING are negative and 
significant. Also the estimated coefficient of the interaction term is also significant. Therefore 
it can be concluded that the volatility reducing effects of sovereign credit rating is robust to 
alternative estimators and also that the global financial crisis has contributed to the volatility 
of growth of output by weakening this relationship. 
 
In estimating equations (1) and (2), the depended variable was volatility of per capita GDP 
growth which is calculated as the squared deviation of actual growth from the mean. This is a 
overall measure of output variability. Perhaps even more important are the economic 
downturns that occur periodically and have long characterised market economies. To analyse 
the link between rating and economic downturn, a probit analysis is performed on the same 
data. The estimated model is slightly different from the previous ones which is as follows: 
 
ititit
iititit
uXDRATINGGFC
GFCDRATINGRATINGDOWN


64
3210
)(
                             

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(3) 
 
The right hand side variables are same as before but the depended variable DOWN has been 
transformed into a binary one where it takes a value equal to 1 when per capita GDP growth 
is negative or 0 when growth is positive. This allows to analyse if credit ratings has any 
implication  negative growth only.  The probit results are summarised in Table (3), where 
column (1) represents the population-averaged probit estimation of equation (3) and column 
(2) represents the random effect estimations. The results are not promising compared to has 
been found so far. However, it can be seen that in both estimations the coefficient on 
RATING is found to be negative and significant at 10 percent. So there is some evidence, 
albeit very weak, that credit rating can also lead to reduction in economic downturn.  
  
 Table 3 
 
Dependent variable: Binary variable when per capita GDP growth is negative, dependent variable = 1; 
otherwise 0) 
(PROBIT Estimator) 
Regressor 
 
(1) 
Population-Averaged 
(2) 
RE 
RATING -0.0145 
(-1.79)* 
-0.0144 
(-1.70)* 
DRATING -0.1012 
(-1.42) 
-0.1013 
(-1.33) 
GFC -0.1190 
(-1.22) 
-0.1205 
(-1.22) 
GFC*DRATING 0.0163 
(0.09) 
0.0162 
(0.09) 
OIL 0.0039 
(0.89) 
0.0037 
(0.84) 
STOCK  3.05e-13 
(0.60) 
3.17e-13 
(0.60) 
CONS -2.1560 
(-19.19)*** 
-2.1823 
(-17.41)*** 
Summary Statistics  
 
  
Log likelihood  -551.7714 
No. of observation/countries 10609/76 10609/76 
 
The final model presented in this paper to analyse the rating – volatility link is based on the 
observation that there could be simultaneity between them—just as rating can affect 
volatility; it can also get affected by volatility. A simultaneous relationship between credit 
rating and volatility requires an appropriate model and estimator to be used which accounts 
for this joint determination of both rating and volatility by modelling them simultaneously. 
With these objectives the following model is estimated: 
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The variables in equation (4.1) are same as before and some of the variables in equation (4.2) 
are new and they have been as determinants of sovereign credit ratings. MONEY is monetary 
policy stand, INF is rate of inflations, COMPRISK is composite risk as measured in ICRG, 
LGDP stands for log of GDP, GROWTH is for per capita GDP growth, and VINF is 
volatility of inflation. Equations (4.1) and (4.2) are jointly estimated as a system using the 
three stage least square estimator and the results are presented in Table 4. Column (1) 
presents the estimated coefficients of the volatility equation. It can be seen that the signs of 
the estimated coefficients and their significance are very similar to those in Table 3. In 
particular, the estimated coefficient of RATING and DRATIING are negative and significant 
as they have been before conforming the notion that credit rating contributes to lower growth 
volatility. What is also seen from column is that the estimated coefficient on the interaction 
term (GFC*DRATING) is negative and significant. The joint test on the coefficients of 
DRATING clearly rejects the null. This leads to the conclusion that whilst the direct effect of 
GFC on growth volatility has been insignificant, the indirect of GFC has been its contribution 
towards it by weakening the volatility reducing effect of credit rating. Among the control 
variable, oil prices have consistently contributed towards increased volatility of output by 
having a positive and significant coefficients in all specifications.  
 
In column (2) the estimated coefficients of the RATING equation is presented. It can be seen 
that volatility itself is a major determinant of credit rating because the estimated sign of VOL 
is negative and significant. This implies volatility will lead to reduced ratings. With regard to 
policy the variables MONEY, INF and VINF seem to be important as these can instruments 
for conducting monetary policy. The variable MONEY which is an indicator variable set 
equal to one if the short-term interest rate was increased (until the next interest rate cut), zero 
otherwise represents the monetary policy stance of the authority. With a positive and 
significant estimated coefficient on this variable it can be concluded that a increase in short 
term rate before it is reduced next can increase credit rating because it shows the commitment 
of the monetary authority to discipline the economy. On the contrary high inflation and 
inflation volatility can lead to lower credit rating as can be seen from the estimated 
coefficients on INF and VINF are negative and significant at 1 percent. High inflation and 
volatility of inflation represents an unstable macroeconomic environment which leads to 
decrease in sovereign.  
  
Table 4 
 
Dependent variables: Volatility of per capita GDP growth, Rating 
(Three stage least square (3SLS) estimator) 
Endogenous Variables: Volatility of per capita GDP growth, Rating 
Regressor 
 
(1) 
VOLATILITY 
(2) 
RATING 
RATING -0.000015 
(-6.47)*** 
 
DRATING -0.000105 
(-2.65)*** 
 
GFC 9.50e-06 
(0.41) 
 
GFC*DRATING -0.000126 
(-1.69)* 
 
OIL 2.76e-06 
(2.46)** 
 
STOCK  2.10e-17 
(0.884) 
 
VOLATILITY  -11.6914 
(-4.02)*** 
MONETARY POLICY STANCE  0.36735 
(8.02)*** 
INFLATION  -0.22152 
(-6.59)*** 
COMPRISK  0.33421 
(73.37)*** 
LOG(GDP)  1.43645 
(51.11)*** 
GDP GROWTH  0.05054 
(0.02) 
INFLATION VOLATILITY  -0.17487 
(-7.47)*** 
CONS 0.000356 
(10.82)*** 
-20.8765 
(82.71)*** 
χ2-Statistics and Summary 
Statistics  
 
  
χ2-statistic testing coefficients 
on DRATING 
(P-value) 
9.16 
(0.002) 
 
R
2
  0.0075 0.8269 
RMSE 0.0009 2.0859 
χ2-statistic  (overall) 
(P-value) 
71.38 
(0.000) 
42420.35 
(0.000) 
No. of observation/countries 8873/76 8873/76 
 
  
4. Sovereign Credit Rating and Growth Volatility: The Missing Link 
 
In the preceding sections an attempt has been made to empirically establish a link between 
credit rating and growth volatility. The evidence confirms that such a relation exists and that 
it is robust. In this last we make an attempt to explain why credit rating decreases volatility 
of output. The mechanism by which the effect of credit ratings fall on to the real sector of 
the economy can be attributed on its impact on the sovereign credit default swap (CDS) 
spread.  That is sovereign credit rating changes cause higher volatility in the sovereign CDS 
spreads exacerbating the uncertainty of the market’s perception on whether a sovereign is 
going to default which has real economic consequences and thus can affect output volatility.  
 
Table 5 
Rating Changes and Sovereign CDS spread and volatility 
Variables Dependent Variables 
CDS Spread CDS Volatility 
RATINGS -0.00329 
(-3.23)*** 
-0.00323 
(-3.27)*** 
-0.00053 
(-2.82)*** 
-0.00054 
(-2.80)*** 
DRATING -0.01219 
(-2.13)** 
 -0.00383 
(-2.08)** 
 
POSITIVE 
DRATING 
 -0.00275 
(-0.62) 
 -0.00228 
(-0.68) 
NEGATIVE 
DRATING 
 0.05657 
(2.86)*** 
 0.01181 
(2.41)** 
OIL -0.00033 
(-2.63)*** 
-0.00032 
(-2.60)*** 
-0.00015 
(-7.90)*** 
-0.00015 
(-7.85)*** 
GROWTH -0.22144 
(-3.55)*** 
-0.21677 
(-3.45)*** 
-0.08027 
(-2.22)** 
-0.07826 
(-2.17)** 
INFLATION 0.05427 
(2.17)** 
0.52667 
(2.10)** 
0.02765 
(15.73)*** 
0.02744 
(15.55) 
CONS 0.05808 
(4.00)*** 
0.05659 
(4.05)*** 
0.00741 
(2.38)** 
0.00731 
(2.34)** 
NO. OF 
OBS/GROUPS 
4530/70 4530/70 4530/70 4530/70 
WALD χ2-statistic   19.73 
(0.001) 
8.99 
(0.109) 
29.52 
(0.000) 
12.55 
(0.050) 
WITHN R
2
 0.266 0.105 0.276 0.106 
   
In Table 5 we report generalised least square (GLS) estimates on the effects of credit ratings 
changes on both CDS spread and CDS spread volatility. Our variable of interest is 
DRATING. We also create a  new variable POSITIVE DRATING which is an indicator 
variables taking value equal to 1 when DRATING is positive. Similarly for NEGATIVE 
DRATING but when change in rating is negative. We also use oil price (OIL), GDP growth 
per capita and inflation rate as control variables. The findings show that credit rating 
changes have a negative impact on CDS spread and on its volatility. This can be seen from 
the coefficient on DRATING which is negative and significant. However what is interesting 
is to note that this effect is asymmetric. The effect of positive change in ratings is negative 
but insignificant. But the effect of negative changes in ratings is positive and significant, 
that is only negative changes in rating increases both CDS spread and its volatility. 
However, since on the aggregate DRATING lowers CDS spread and CDS spread volatility, 
sovereign credit rating changes can help reduce uncertainty in the overall macroeconomy 
and thus cause to lower output volatility.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
The empirical fact that output volatility may induce lower growth (Ramey and Ramey, 
1995) is an important finding for policy makers because reducing growth volatility can be a 
key target via which one of the main objectives of macroeconomic policies – higher 
economic growth – can be achieved. As a result it has become crucial to understand what 
determines growth volatility. Using monthly data from January 1996 up to May 2010 for a 
panel of 76 developed and emerging economies and adopting an instrumental variable 
estimation technique by correcting for both heterogeneity and endogeneity (correlation 
between the regressors and the idiosyncratic error) using the generalized two-stage least 
squares (G2SLS, EC2SLS) procedure method suggested by Balestra and Varadharajan-
Krishnakumar (1987) and Baltagi (1995), this paper provides empirical evidence that an 
alternative channel via which growth volatility is reduced is through increases in sovereign 
country ratings. The paper also provides a new insight on the effect of global financial crisis 
(GFC) that it has contributed towards increased macroeconomic volatility by weakening 
this volatility reducing effect of sovereign country rating. Acknowledging the simultaneity 
between rating and volatility where output volatility may be a determining factor for 
sovereign country rating, the paper adopts a system approach and uses three stage least 
square (3SLS) estimator and finds that volatility reducing effect of country credit rating is 
robust. The 3SLS estimates also show that monetary policy stance, inflation and inflation 
volatility are major determinants of sovereign rating. As a result, monetary policy can be 
effectively used to increase sovereign credit rating and achieve lower output volatility. As a 
final note, it must stressed that the objective of this paper is to put forward a case that there 
is possible link between growth volatility and sovereign credit rating using simple 
econometric model. It has been shown in the paper that the link between sovereign ratings 
changes and growth volatility is through CDS spread. Changes in sovereign credit ratings 
lowers CDS spread and CDS spread volatility, and therefore reduce uncertainty in the 
overall macroeconomy which leads to lower output volatility.  
 
 
  
Data Appendix 
Variable Data Definition Sources 
VOL Volatility of per capita GDP 
growth measured as squared 
deviation of per capita GDP 
growth from its mean. 
Calculated by author. Per capita 
GDP growth data from  
World development indicators 
(2010). 
RATING Sovereign credit ratings provided 
by Standard and Poors.  The 
ratings have been converted to a 
linear time series following 
Gande and Parsley (2005). 
Standard and Poors. 
 
CDS Sovereign credit default swap 
spread. 
Bloomberg. 
DRATING First difference on RATING Author. 
GFC Binary variable =1 if time equals 
2010:07 to 2010:05. It represents 
Global Financial Crisis months. 
Author. 
OIL World oil price 
 
Datastream. 
STOCK Total value of shares traded 
during the period (current US$) 
 
World development indicators 
(2010). 
 
MONEY An indicator variable set equal to 
one if the short-term interest 
rate was increased (until the next 
interest rate cut), zero otherwise. 
 
World development indicators 
(2010). 
 
INF Inflation rate.  World development indicators 
(2010). 
 
VINF Volatility of inflation rate 
measured as deviation of actual 
inflation from its mean. 
Calculated by author. 
LY Log of Gross domestic product- 
value of goods produced per 
person in the country. 
 
World development indicators 
(2010). 
 
GROWTH Real GDP per capita growth rate. World development indicators 
(2010). 
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